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TOWARD A SOCIAL CONCEPTION
OF SOENTIFIC RATIONALITY

Gonzalo Munevar
Department of Philosophy and Religion
University of Nebraska at Omaha
Omaha, Nebraska 68182

more likely-thus the connection between method and reason.
To be rational in science, then, is identified with living up to
the standards of scientific rationality, i.e., to follow methodological rules such as, "reject hypotheses that are in conflict
with well confirmed hypotheses," "reject hypotheses that are
in conflict with the facts," "do not make ad hoc moves," and
the like.

This paper examines the consequences of Feyerabend's thesis
against the notion of scientific method. It is claimed that he has a
strong case. Comparisons are made with other contemporary philosophers of science such as Kuhn and Lakatos. A result of the case against
method is that science appears not to be a rational enterprise. This conclusion is resisted. Nevertheless, in order to show that the rationality
of science is compatible with Feyerabend's thesis, it is necessary to
switch from a conception that ascribes scientific rationality to the
individual scientist to a conception in which rationality is ascribed only
to the enterprise of science as a whole. Then, scientific rationality is a
social, or perhaps structural, property and our science actually has it to
a large extent.

t

t

Of course, whether science could be shown to be rational
has always been a favorite subject for skepticism. But Feyerabend's case is of a different sort. What he argued is that in
paradigm cases of scientific success it seems that the relevant
scientists did not follow the method. Furthermore, success
did not come about in spite of the violation of the method
(e.g., by luck, shortcuts, etc.), but rather it required that
very violation. Feyerabend's argument against method, and
hence against rationality, is a reductio:

t

The work of Kuhn (1970) and Feyerabend (1975 and
1978) has challenged anew the thesis that science is a rational
enterprise. The reaction has been swift, but the arguments so
far advanced against Kuhn and Feyerabend are not very compelling. On the other hand, what Feyerabend says is not incompatible with a rational picture of science. This paper
develops such a picture.

1. Success is the justification for adhering to scientific
rationality.
2. But, rationality actually gets in the way of success.

First, it is necessary to understand the nature of the case
presented by Kuhn and Feyerabend. In philosophy of science
circles, scientific methodology and rationality go hand in
hand. There seems to be a plausible case for such a connection.
Science has seemed to be a most successful enterprise, and it
is not unreasonable that people would want to know the basis
for that success. It was thought that science succeeded where
other human enterprises failed because science proceeded differently, because it had a method all its own. Determining the
method acquired great importance, then, because by its
rigorous application we could improve already existing science
and extend science to new areas.

3. Thus, rationality and success are incompatible.
Feyerabend need not have any particular stake on whether science is actually successful, and he does not have to
believe in the sanctity of argument or in the evidential techniques that he uses in historical analyses. He simply plays the
rationalist game, accepts the rationalist starting position for
the sake of argument, and then shows that no methodological
rule can be excluded from violation, that from the point of
view of the rationalist, "anything goes." It seems then that
anarchy has reigned in science, and that it ought to reign if
science is to progress.

According to this scheme, following the method would
guarantee the success of science, or at least make such success

There have been so many misunderstandings on this score
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that the main points bear emphasizing. First, Feyerabend
made no claim "to possess special knowledge about what is
good and what is bad in the sciences." According to him:
Everyone can read the terms in his own way and in
accordance with the tradition to which he belongs.
Thus for an empiricist "progress" will mean transition
to a theory that provides direct empirical tests for
most of its basic assumptions.... For others, "progress" may mean unification and harmony, perhaps
even at the expense of empirical adequacy.... And
my thesis is that anarchism helps achieve progress in
anyone of the senses one cares to choose (Feyerabend, 1975).

Second, it is a simple point of elementary logic that when
giving a reductio ad absurdum one need not be committed
to the truth of the assumptions one accepts for the sake of
argument. Thus Feyerabend (1975) said,
Always remember that the demonstrations and the
rhetorics used do not express any "deep convictions"
of mine. They merely show how easy it is to lead
people by the nose in a rational way. An anarchist is
like an undercover agent who plays the game of
Reason in order to undercut the authority of Reason
(Truth, Honesty, Justice, and so on).
Third, Anything Goes is not really offered as methodological principle. It is rather a description of what things look
like from the rationalist perspective after the force of Feyerabend's arguments is recognized. Feyerabend(1975) is clear on
this matter:
One might get the impression that I recommend a
new methodology which replaces induction by
counterinduction and uses a multiplicity of theories,
metaphysical views, fairy-tales instead of the customary pair theory/observation. This impression
would certainly be mistaken. My intention is not to
replace one set of general rules by another such set:
my intention is, rather, to convince the reader that all
methodologies, even the most obvious ones, have
their limits. The best way to show this is to demonstrate the limits and even the irrationality of some
rules that she, or he, is likely to regard as basic.
Feyerabend's demonstrations consist of historical examinations and epistemological analysis of the relation between
idea and action. For every "basic" methodological rule of empiricism he claimed that he could show that a "counterrule"
may be preferred. He suggested, for example, a counterrule
which "advises us to introduce and elaborate hypotheses
which are inconsistent with well-established theories and/or

well-established facts. It advises us to proceed counterinductively" (Feyerabend, 1975).
In favor of his counterrule, Feyerabend argued that the
evidence to refute a theory is often unearthed only with the
help of incompatible alternatives. As for facts, observations,
and experimental results, they all contain theoretical assumptions, or assert them by the manner of their use. But, those
assumptions which shape our view of the world are often not
accessible to direct criticism, for usually we are not even aware
of them. Prejudices, then, are found by contrast, not by analysis. " ... we need a dream world," Feyerabend said, "in order
to discover the features of the real world we think we inhabit
(and which may actually be just another dream-world)." But
the invention of this dream world designed to clash with our
well established views, experimental results, and so on, is a
counterinductive step. "Counterinduction is therefore always
reasonable and has always a chance of success" (Feyerabend,
1975).
The history of science can be used to illustrate Feyerabend's sort of epistemological analysis. Consider the following
two examples. At the beginning of last century Prout (see
Lakatos, 1970) suggested that atomic weights should be expressed by whole numbers (since they were all multiples of the
atomic weight of hydrogen). Unfortunately there were clear
exceptions. The atomic weight of chlorine, for instance, was
35.6. Such was the result obtained from samples of "pure"
Cl by the best practitioners of the science. There was no observational error and there was nothing really at fault with the
purification techniques. More and better measurements would
not have led to the conclusion (which would be favored today)
that Prout was correct in spite of what seemed to be a clear
refutation of his hypothesis. What was required instead was
the development of a very different view of nature: modern
atomic theory, and especially the notion of isotopes. As it
turned out, the "pure" samples of Cl contained two isotopes
of the element (of course, that is still pure Cl, for it is not
mixed with other elements). The measured weight was that of
the mix of the two isotopes.
Another case, which Feyerabend (1975) discussed in great
detail, is that of Galileo. Let us concentrate on the Tower
Argument. If a stone is dropped from the top of a high tower,
the stone will hit the ground at approximately the same distance from the base of the tower as it was from the top of the
tower at the initial moment of descent. Anyone can see that
the stone moves straight down. This motion was taken as a
refutation of the view that the earth moved. If the earth
moves, the tower should have moved a considerable distance
by the time the stone hit the ground. But, the distance between stone and tower remains the same. Or else, the stone
must have fallen diagonally, but this is plainly not so. Thus,
the earth cannot be in motion. Once again, what was required
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to overcome arguments such as this, was a new way of interpreting the phenomena, a set of "natural interpretations"
that already assumes that the earth moves. Galileo challenged
the concept of motion as observed motion. Some motion goes
unobserved, he said, because it is shared by the observer. In
the case of the Tower Argument, the stone only seems to
move straight down. The real motion of the stone is a combination of circular inertia-which is shared by the earth, the
tower, the stone, and the observer-and a perpendicular motion toward the center of the earth. The stone did really move
as it had appeared ridiculous to suppose. (Not only did Galileo
apply the counterrule, he saved the day by making a further
and ad hoc hypothesis: circular inertia.)
In both of these cases, as well as in many other crucial
episodes in the history of science, the inductive rules of the
so-called scientific method would have favored the received
view. The moral is that work in alternative and even bizarre
views should not be discouraged [that what Feyerabend
(l975) called the "principle of proliferation" cannot be ruled
out] .
The principle of proliferation is perhaps the most important point where Kuhn and Feyerabend lock heads. They both
would have agreed that there is no method, but Kuhn viewed
the history of science as a series of periods ("normal science")
in which the scientific community is totally committed to a
single point of view (what he called a "paradigm"). During
revolutionary periods, paradigms are overthrown and replaced
by new ones which enjoy the same total commitment from the
scientific community. Revolutions are brought about only by
crises, and these in turn are caused by recalcitrant and significant anomalies (Kuhn, 1970). But as Feyerabend (l970)
pointed out, no anomaly is more significant than one explained within an alternative view. Feyerabend realized, however, that Kuhn had a point when he insisted that a view needs
time and commitment before its worth can be realized. This
means that practitioners may decide to continue work on a
view that may have had some of its predictions falsified, that
they may simply choose to put the falsifying instances on the
back burner. This Feyerabend (l970) called the "principle
of tenacity." Such a principle is most reasonable, for, as
Kuhn (l970) argued, all theories are always besieged by anomalies, but anomalies do not become counterevidence until
they are assimilated within a competing theory (or paradigm).
In F eyerabend's (l975) account there is intense competition among alternative views. But, even those that come worse
off in the struggle need not be abandoned. They may still
make a comeback (as the atomism and the heliocentric view of
the cosmos did), and even if they do not they may still perform a valuable service to science. Thus, progress in science
permits (indeed requires) sticking to a view in the face of conflicting evidence as well as proliferation of views. Science

should then be an interplay of the principles of tenacity and
proliferation. Unfortunately, from the point of view of the
rationalist such an account of science rules out nothing-if
it is correct then anything goes. But if there is no scientific
method, there is no scientific rationality either.
Some rationalists have offered a different approach to
methodology. Lakatos (l970), for example, tried to allow for
the principles of tenacity and proliferation, while still insisting
that some activities are more proper (i. e., rational) than others.
The unit of evaluation is a series of theories (a research program) which changes under the heat generated by competing
theories (principle of proliferation). Such changes constitute a
progressive problem-shift if they lead to an increase in content. If the changes do not anticipate new facts but instead
serve only to assimilate the new discoveries of the competition (thus being ad hoc), the program is said to be degenerating. A program, however, may degenerate for a long time
and still make a comeback (principle of tenacity). As promising as this approach may sound, it has several problems. The
main one, in the context of the present discussion, is that
there is no time limit, nor can there be, that would force
abandonment of a degenerating research program. But then
nothing can be ruled out. In that case Lakatos' and Feyerabend's approaches will not be all that different after all, no
matter how many rationalist garments Lakatos may wear.
Thus, it seems that no rescue awaits rationality down this
avenue of thought either.
Must it be concluded, then, that Feyerabend was correct,
that science cannot be both rational and successful? As often
happens in philosophical controversies, both sides share some
crucial assumptions. In this particular controversy it is assumed that scientific rationality depends on the individual
scientist's adherence to method. The issue of rationality is
thus resolved, as Feyerabend did, by looking at the behavior
of scientists in the light of certain theoretical (e.g., epistemological) considerations. But is such a manner of resolution
correct and is such an assumption warranted? The answer to
both questions is no.
Why should the question of the rationality of science be
considered equivalent to that of the rationality of individual
scientists? After all, the question whether a particular basketball team is good is not settled by determining whether the
individual members of the team are good players. To do so
would be to commit the fallacy of composition. The quality
of the team is determined instead by whether the players
exhibit certain relations to one another on the court. It is, in
a sense, a social property. It may, perhaps, also be called an
organizational or structural property. Now, science may not
seem to be an organic whole, unlike a basketball team. Nonetheless science is a communal enterprise, not only for those
who work as members of research teams, but also for those
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who would be described as lone investigators. Even the latter
form part of a community that shares certain ideas and goals,
though perhaps only in an overlapping manner, and who depend on others for the generation and judgment of most, if
not all, of the new ideas that become part of their intellectual
environment. It is in that communally generated environment
that even individual genius must endure or perish (of course,
survival of some ideas may lead to the transformation of the
intellectual environment)_ In any event, the enterprise of
science is very complex and, as a result, requires division of
labor-no scientist can do it all alone. In this division oflabor
and in the relation to the aims of science, a new conception
of scientific rationality may be glimpsed: a conception that
treats rationality as a social or structural property of the
scientific enterprise.
The intention here is to sketch a social conception of
scientific rationality. Both the need and the plausibility of
such a sketch arise from certain recent developments in the
philosophy of science, most notably Feyerabend's work. So
it is natural that the highlights of this sketch are designed to
take care of Feyerabend's strongest criticisms against rationality. The intent is to show, then, not that scientific rationality
must be conceived in social terms, but rather that it need not
be concluded that the sort of case that Feyerabend developed
is incompatible with the claim that science is a rational enterprise.
If science is structured in such away, if its division of
labor is such that it leads to progress (as exemplified in Feyerabend's kind of cases), then science is rational-or at least, the
rationality of science is compatible with Feyerabend's position.

Science is a communal enterprise which tries to gain
knowledge about the world. Science tries to give pictures of
the world that allow us to make sense of it, to know what to
expect of it, and to know how to deal with it. Such a communal enterprise would be rational if it developed appropriate
strategies to enhance its chances of carrying out its task.
Science would be rational, then, if it were organized (structured) so as to make success more easily achieved.
Now, in a universe of immense variety it would be surprising if the first ideas we ever came up with would be fruitful
to explain all there is. The same point can be made about
methods. New ideas, new methods will enable us to deal with
new areas of the universe, or else permit us to confront changing circumstances. On the other hand, many ideas have much
to offer in dealing with the world if we only give ourselves the
chance to develop them. Thus, the communal enterprise which
aims to gain knowledge is well advised to organize itself so as
to ensure, or at least encourage, the generation of alternatives
(but what is this if not the principle of proliferation?) and

to permit people to develop their ideas even in the face of
damaging evidence (but what is this if not the principle of
tenacity?).
The interplay of these two principles leads to a society
of researchers in which people do what they like best, in which
they develop those views of nature that for any reason have
caught their fancy. At the same time, the quality of work
improves when strong challenge points the way in the directions that could use improvement. Such a society is appropriately organized to face the surprises, to search for the secret
treasures our diverse universe has in store for an intelligent
species. But what is this society, this communal enterprise,
if not science as Feyerabend described it?
Rationality may still be the key to progress, then, but not
the so-called rationality of the individual scientist, but the
rationality of the scientific enterprise as a whole. It does not
matter then that individual scientists either stick to their initial view, no matter what; or that they are always looking for
alternatives and never stick to one point of view; or that they
hold on to the most successful view of their time and look
down upon all others; or that they rave against the received
view, violate method, and perhaps even become historical
figures thanks to that. In other words, it does not matter
whether the individual scientist is dogmatic or anarchistic, as
long as science itself permits the operation of the principles
of proliferation and tenacity.
The point can be illustrated by drawing an analogy to
Feyerabend's own political philosophy. A free society is
normally envisioned as the sort of society in which different
individuals are able to express different opinions and, in general, pursue the life-styles that they favor. In this Feyerabend
very much followed Mill (1956). Such a society, moreover,
does not cease being free because some, or even many, of its
citizens are not open-minded, or because they think poorly of
their fellows' ideas and life-styles. The society is free because
the individuals do not interfere with their fellows' pursuits, no
matter what they think of them, either because there is a tendency to live and let live, or because they fear the arm of the
law if they so interfere. Freedom is a structural property that
some societies have, then, Feyerabend claimed. It functions
like an iron railing on the entire society (Feyerabend, 1978).
Likewise, rationality functions like an iron railing. It is a
structural property that some knowledge-gathering enterprises
may have. Science, as described by Feyerabend, actually has it
to a large extent. So, science, to a large extent, is rational.
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